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Note
An Unacceptable Exception: The Ramifications of
Physician Immunity from Medical Procedure
Patent Infringement Liability
Emily C. Melvin∗
Medical procedure patents first drew political attention in
1993 after Samuel Pallin sued fellow doctor Jack Singer for infringing his cataract surgery procedure patent.1 The lawsuit resulted in an outcry from the medical community,2 culminating
in a vote of the American Medical Association (AMA) House of
Delegates to condemn medical and surgical procedure patents.3
In response to the AMA’s lobbying,4 Congress passed 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c), which did not change the patentability of medical procedures, but instead made medical professionals and their associated healthcare entities immune from infringement liability.5
With the passage of § 287(c), Congress created significant
problems. First, because medical procedure patents are now
unenforceable,6 they are effectively useless.7 It is impossible to
∗ J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
thanks Professor David Adelman for his helpful advice in the development of
this Note. She extends additional thanks to the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review with special thanks to Jason Zucchi and Lindsey Tonsager.
Finally, the author sends her gratitude to Jim and Sandy Melvin and her
friends and family for their support. Copyright © 2007 by Emily C. Melvin.
1. Bradley J. Meier, Note, The New Patent Infringement Liability Exception for Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIS. 265, 265 (1997); see Pallin v. Singer,
No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 1996).
2. William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 651 (1995). One physician stated that a
victory by the plaintiff in the lawsuit could cause “profoundly devastating and
mind-boggling consequences.” Id. The AMA called these patents “horrendous.”
Id.
3. Id.
4. See Eric M. Lee, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)—The Physician Immunity Statute,
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 701, 707 (1997).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
6. Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search
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determine how many medical procedures have gone undeveloped as a result of lost funding due to unenforceable patents.8
Even for developed procedures, doctors may now be resorting to
trade secrecy to obtain protection because Congress has eliminated the benefits of patent protection.9 Second, § 287(c) violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).10 Any TRIPS violation sets a precedent for other nations to apply similar exceptions to other technologies.11 The United States must take the lead in intellectual
property enforcement,12 because reduced intellectual property
protection results in lost jobs and increased costs to U.S. consumers.13 Thus, the growing importance of intellectual property
protection abroad warrants further review of any provision in
which U.S. compliance with TRIPS is questionable.14
This Note argues that because § 287(c) violates TRIPS,
Congress must find an alternative solution that appropriately
balances the ethical and economic concerns regarding medical
for a Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1527,
1557 (1997) (describing how the statute renders “patents unenforceable
against the most frequent users of the patented procedures”).
7. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (“A patent without a meaningful remedy against infringement is like
no patent at all.”).
8. Cf. id. (stating that it is unknown whether medical procedures develop
swiftly without patent protection).
9. See Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 365 (1997). These arguments are equally applicable against § 287(c). See Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 613 n.54 (2000).
10. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (arguing that the statute raises questions about compliance with
TRIPS); Ho, supra note 9, at 655–70 (detailing § 287(c)’s noncompliance with
TRIPS).
11. See Ho, supra note 9, at 671–72.
12. Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 28, 2006), at 12, available at http://www.ustr
.gov/assets/Document_Library/Transcripts/2006/September/asset_upload_
file794_9872.pdf?ht=.
13. Cf. 142 CONG. REC. S11,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (“Virtually every trade expert believes that worldwide adherence
to TRIP [sic] means jobs for American workers, and lowered costs for American consumers as piracy of products is reduced and others pay their fair share
of research and development costs.”).
14. Tackling the problems of intellectual property enforcement abroad is a
priority of the United States. Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property
Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 317 (2006); Schwab, supra note 12, at 2.

MELVIN_4FMT

1090

4/16/2007 8:52:49 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1088

procedure patents. Part I describes the general patentability of
medical procedures under U.S. law and the debate over these
patents. Part II discusses the problems that § 287(c) poses under TRIPS. Finally, Part III addresses potential solutions and
proposes a TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing system. This
Note concludes that the most appropriate way to address the
ethical concerns regarding medical procedure patents while
providing an incentive to innovate is to adopt a compulsory licensing scheme that meets the TRIPS criteria.
I. THE DEBATE OVER MEDICAL PROCEDURE
PATENTABILITY
The patent system derives from Congress’s constitutional
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15 Patents are considered necessary to encourage innovation by protecting the capital investments required to develop new
technology.16 Thus, the function of patents is not to reward inventors,17 but to “secure the invention for public benefit.”18
It is well established that medical procedures are patentable under U.S. law.19 Since 1954, when the Patent Office
held that medical and surgical methods were patentable,20 numerous medical and surgical procedure patents have been issued.21 After the Pallin litigation, however, the AMA called for
Congress to abolish these patents.22 The following sections describe the arguments for and against patentability of medical

15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Noonan, supra note 2, at 656.
17. See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT
RIGHTS 2 (2d ed. 2005).
18. Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of
Medical Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1987).
19. Ho, supra note 9, at 611.
20. See Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (1954) (rejecting
prior holdings that prohibited medical procedure patents). For one such holding, see Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 883–84 (1862).
21. See Noonan, supra note 2, at 653–55.
22. See AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CEJA REPORT 1A-95, ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE PATENTING OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES 8 (1995),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_1a95.pdf
[hereinafter AMA REPORT] (describing the various ethical objections to medical procedure patents and urging Congress to outlaw the practice).
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procedures and the congressional response to the AMA’s concerns.
A. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PATENTABILITY
The AMA argued that medical procedure patents compromise patients’ rights to privacy, practitioners’ freedom, the dissemination of information, and access to procedures at reasonable costs.23 However, many academics consider patents
necessary to encourage investment in the invention and development of new technologies.24 These proponents argue that the
AMA’s ethical objections have no force because, in the absence
of patents, innovation is stymied.25 Thus, more people are
harmed in the absence of patent protection because many beneficial procedures go undeveloped.26
1. Patients’ Rights to Privacy
Opponents of medical procedure patents argued that monitoring medical activity for infringement would compromise
physician-patient confidentiality.27 This confidentiality benefits
public and individual health because “it encourages the patient
to fully disclose his condition[, which makes] diagnosis more
accurate and therapy more effective.”28 Yet, even opponents
noted that it is possible to enforce patents without compromising confidentiality.29 Infringement litigation does not require
disclosure of confidential patient information.30 Moreover, in
practice, patient confidentiality is not absolute even in the absence of patent infringement litigation.31 Thus, most scholars
have dismissed this confidentiality argument.32

23. See id. at 3–7.
24. See, e.g., Noonan, supra note 2, at 656–57.
25. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142; see also 142 CONG. REC. S11,845
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. Hatch) (“It is impossible to state
categorically . . . that tomorrow’s advances in ‘pure’ medical procedures will
take place as expeditiously as possible absent patent protection.”).
26. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (describing the link between medical procedure patents and increased quality of health care).
27. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 5.
28. Burch, supra note 18, at 1155.
29. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 5.
30. Lee, supra note 4, at 715.
31. Burch, supra note 18, at 1155.
32. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 9, at 633–34; Lee, supra note 4, at 715.
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2. Practitioner Freedom and Doctors’ Duties to Patients
The AMA also expressed concern that a patent could influence a doctor’s medical judgment.33 Some physicians might perform an inferior procedure rather than license the patented
procedure or risk an infringement suit.34 Thus, these patents
decrease physician autonomy35 and compromise a doctor’s duty
to provide the best medical care to the patient regardless of
cost.36 On the other hand, proponents of medical procedure patents noted that absolute discretion of the physician is unrealistic notwithstanding patent considerations.37 Furthermore, the
fiduciary duties that doctors already face alleviate any potential compromise to patient care.38 Because doctors have a duty
to fully disclose all of their interests when giving the patient a
choice of procedures, the patient is able to make an informed
decision, taking the costs of licensing and alternate procedures
into consideration.39
3. Incentives to Disclose: Preventing Secret Procedures
The AMA argued that medical procedure patents encourage physicians to withhold information—an incentive which
violates the obligation of the medical profession to “share techniques as needed.”40 Physicians believe that patenting these
procedures slows the dissemination of information about new
techniques to the public.41 Thus, opponents of medical procedure patents argued, when a physician has the option of patenting a medical technique, she will be more likely to refrain
from publishing that technique in a medical journal until she
files her patent application or even until the patent is issued.42
This contention ignores the fact that publication does not
preclude patentability in the United States if the patent appli33. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3.
34. See Lee, supra note 4, at 703; Burch, supra note 18, at 1152–53.
35. Burch, supra note 18, at 1141.
36. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1547.
37. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1154.
38. Meier, supra note 1, at 267.
39. Id.; see also Joseph M. Reisman, Comment, Physicians and Surgeons
as Inventors: Reconciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 355, 371 (1995) (noting that a doctor owes a fiduciary duty to her
patients).
40. AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
41. Meier, supra note 1, at 268.
42. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 4; see also Gocyk-Farber, supra
note 6, at 1548.
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cation is filed within one year of publication.43 In fact, proponents of medical procedure patents argue that these patents
reduce secrecy by requiring disclosure,44 which is one of the
primary purposes of patent law.45 Without this protection, physicians could choose to protect their inventions as trade secrets.46 This alternative would be detrimental to the health system,47 because many procedures would not be available to the
general public.48
4. Access to Procedures and the Incentive to Innovate
The argument the AMA stressed most heavily was that
medical procedure patents would result in reduced availability
of procedures.49 A patentee could restrict the number of licenses or charge a high price for licensing—actions which
would decrease patient access to the treatments and increase
patient costs.50 Additionally, patented procedures are not peerreviewed—unless they are licensees, other physicians cannot
study patented procedures without infringing the patent.51
These arguments are compelling; however, they only apply if
innovation would continue to occur absent patent protection.52
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Meier, supra note 1, at 268.
44. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1539.
45. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87
(1933) (“In consideration of [the inventor’s] disclosure and the consequent
benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is
guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon the expiration of that period,
the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled
without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.”), amended by 289 U.S.
706 (1933).
46. See Katopis, supra note 9, at 365; cf. Christopher T. Kent, Note, Reducing the Scope of Patent Protection and Incentives for Innovation Through
Unfair Application of Prosecution History Estoppel and the Recapture Rule, 10
GEO. MASON L. REV. 595, 625 (2002) (noting that “if the value of the patent
monopoly is reduced,” inventors may “resort to trade secrets”).
47. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (stating that the advancement of
medical knowledge increases the quality of society’s healthcare system).
48. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2507 (2006) (describing the social costs of
trade secrecy to include the obligation to hide valuable information from the
public).
49. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3–5.
50. Id. at 3; see also 142 CONG. REC. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Frist) (“[H]ealth care costs would explode if doctors charged
licensing fees for every new surgical or medical techniques [sic] they developed.”).
51. AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
52. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142.
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If eliminating medical procedure patents removes the incentive
to innovate, the result would be a decrease, rather than an increase, in the availability of medical procedures.53 Thus, the
AMA’s argument only has force if the medical procedures would
have been developed in the absence of patent protection.54
The AMA supported its claims by suggesting that patenting medical procedures was unnecessary to promote innovation
because “the development of medical processes usually relies on
intellectual curiosity rather than the availability of capital for
research and development.”55 This argument reflects an assumption that physicians develop medical procedures, unlike
medical devices and pharmaceuticals, during the course of
practice.56 Additionally, the AMA asserted that professional
rewards such as recognition, respect, and publication were sufficient to encourage invention.57
No empirical study has determined the developmental
costs of medical procedures.58 While it is true that, unlike medical devices and pharmaceuticals, medical procedures do not require the investment necessary to gain FDA approval,59 it is
impossible to state categorically that these procedures are inexpensive to develop. Indeed, several notable medical procedures required significant funding to develop.60 The Surrogate
53. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (“It would be really quite tragic if we were to find that a very large
loophole were to be opened in the patent system that would cause investment
in some of the most important technology—not just from an economic point of
view but from a life-saving point of view, to cause that investment to dry up.”);
Katopis, supra note 9, at 385 (“[The] lack of benefit for these investors would
lead to limited patient access to new discoveries as people would be reluctant
to invent.”).
54. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (“If the grant of a medical process
patent decreases the availability of a health care process, an ethical objection
may arise. This ethical objection fails, however, if patent protection is necessary to make the medical procedure possible in the first place.”).
55. AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7; see also 142 CONG. REC. S12,024
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“[U]nlike innovations in
medical devices or drugs, pure-procedure innovations do not require huge investments of capital.”).
56. Ho, supra note 9, at 615–16.
57. Id. at 614; see also AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 6 (describing how
the “prospect of publication” provided an incentive for Dr. Pallin to develop the
new cataract surgery procedure).
58. Ho, supra note 9, at 615.
59. See Todd R. Miller, The International Suture: A Comparative Approach to Patenting Methods of Medical Treatment, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 443, 446 (1996).
60. See Lee, supra note 4, at 716.
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Embryo Transfer procedure research required a $500,000 capital investment because the National Institutes of Health would
not provide financial support.61 This funding would not have
been available were there no chance that the invention could be
patented,62 because private investors view patents as important
for securing returns on their investments.63 Thus, the arguments against patenting medical procedures hold no force if
eliminating these patents “kill[s] the ‘goose that lays the golden
egg.’”64 The costs of patenting are warranted if the procedure
would never have been developed in the absence of patent protection.65
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE MEDICAL
PRACTITIONER IMMUNITY STATUTE
After the AMA’s protest, Congress considered legislation
designed to address the ethical concerns of the AMA and opponents of medical procedure patents.66 Senator Greg Ganske
first proposed a bill that excluded medical procedures from patentability.67 Senator Bill Frist responded by introducing the
Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, which
provided that it is not infringement for a patient, physician, or
licensed healthcare practitioner to use or induce others to use a
patented medical procedure.68 In the debate over these bills,
legislators decided early on to focus on the available remedies

61. 142 CONG. REC. S11,847 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (citing Noonan, supra note 2, at 656–57); Lee, supra note 4, at 716.
62. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,847 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (citing Noonan, supra note 2, at 656–57); Lee, supra note 4, at 716.
63. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1541 (“Private investors are attracted by the promise of a reasonable return on their investment and patents
are the equivalents of such a promise.”).
64. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (quoting Commissioner Lehman).
65. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (“Medical process patents therefore
are justified insofar as they encourage the advancement of medical knowledge,
which in turn increases the overall quantity and quality of society’s health
care.”).
66. See Ho, supra note 9, at 606–07.
67. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789, 790 (1996); see
Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, H.R. 1127, 104th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1995).
68. Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 794; see Medical Procedures Innovation
and Affordability Act, S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
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for infringement rather than on patentability.69 This compromise between the Ganske and Frist proposals was appended to
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act and signed into
law on September 30, 1996.70
The resulting statute exempts medical practitioners and
their employers from liability for infringing a medical procedure patent filed after September 30, 1996.71 Thus, the patentee has no remedy for a medical practitioner’s or related
healthcare entity’s infringement.72 Although the inventor has a
patent on his procedure, it is the equivalent of “no patent at
all.”73 This solution is problematic. It provides no means for a
patentee to collect royalties, and thus creates no financial incentive to innovate.74 Moreover, without patent enforcement,
doctors are encouraged to protect their innovations as trade secrets.75 Finally, the amendment violates TRIPS and may have
serious implications for intellectual property protection
abroad.76 This final concern is the focus of this Note.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE DEBATE
OVER MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in
1995, and TRIPS is a mandatory component of the WTO sys-

69. Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 795.
70. Lee, supra note 4, at 708; see Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-67 to 3009-69
(1996).
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
72. Lee, supra note 4, at 708.
73. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch).
74. See id. at S11,847 (describing the Surrogate Embryo Transfer procedure and arguing that patents are necessary for innovation when the costs of
research are high).
75. See Katopis, supra note 9, at 365. It follows that if the amendment results in medical procedure patents being the equivalent of “no patent at all,”
142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. Hatch), the
same trade secrecy could result from § 287(c). Cf. Ho, supra note 9, at 613 n.54
(“[A]rguments against the patenting of medical procedures are equally applicable to arguments against enforcing medical procedure patents . . . .”).
76. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,843–44 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from
Jennifer Hillman, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) (describing the international implications of the proposed limitation); id. at S11,845 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. Hatch) (describing the complicated issues the
statute raises under TRIPS and stating that “[t]here is no consensus on these
issues”).
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tem.77 Thus, as a member of the WTO, the United States is subject to TRIPS, a comprehensive agreement on intellectual property protection.78 TRIPS has been extremely successful, providing the United States with “new tools with which to badger
recalcitrant countries, especially in the developing world.”79 As
members of the WTO, many important developing countries are
subject to the TRIPS provisions.80 These countries are of great
economic concern to the United States because of their underdeveloped intellectual property regimes and their potential for
economic, political, and social power.81
During the debate over § 287(c), Senator Orrin Hatch,
Chairman of the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committee, repeatedly expressed concern that Congress had failed to adequately address TRIPS compliance.82 Others, including the
U.S. Trade Representative83 and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association,84 voiced similar concerns. The following sections detail how § 287(c) violates TRIPS and the potential impact of that violation.
A. MEDICAL PRACTITIONER IMMUNITY VIOLATES TRIPS
TRIPS requires that patents confer on their owners the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention.85 In addition, patent rights must be available
without discrimination by field of technology.86 However, under
77. Howard C. Anawalt, Intellectual Property Scope: International Intellectual Property, Progress, and the Rule of Law, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 55, 59 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003).
78. See PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 28 (describing the unique
“comprehensiveness” of TRIPS).
79. BÉNÉDICTE CALLAN, PIRATES ON THE HIGH SEAS, THE UNITED STATES
AND GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (1998).
80. See John F. Delaney, IP Aspects of Outsourcing, in 12TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 363, 368 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 8821,
2006).
81. See Bird, supra note 14, at 317–19 (describing developing countries’
weak intellectual property schemes and expanding economic markets).
82. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S11,843, S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)
(letter from Sen. Hatch).
83. See id. at S11,843 (letter from Jennifer Hillman, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative).
84. See id. at S11,845 (letter from Sen. Hatch).
85. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights art. 28, Dec. 15, 1993, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
86. Id. art. 27.
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Article 30, member countries may provide exceptions to these
rights if the “exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”87 Article 31
also allows exceptions in the form of compulsory licensing, but
imposes certain requirements on those exceptions.88 For example, the license must be based on individual merits,89 the potential licensee must attempt to negotiate a license with the patentee prior to obtaining a compulsory license,90 and the
patentee must receive adequate remuneration.91 This section
examines how medical practitioner immunity from infringement liability violates these TRIPS mandates.
1. The Right to Exclude
TRIPS Article 28 requires that a patent provide the patentee with the right to exclude others from making and using
the patented invention.92 With an infringement exemption for
medical procedure patents, patentees have no way of enforcing
that right in the United States.93 Patentees cannot sue medical
practitioners, the most likely infringers of their product,94 for
either damages or an injunction prohibiting use of the patented
device.95 As a result, any medical practitioner can use the patented product without paying royalties. Prohibiting such unauthorized use is the essence of the right to exclude.96 Thus,
87. Id. art. 30.
88. Ho, supra note 9, at 668–69; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85,
art. 31.
89. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(a).
90. Id. art. 31(b).
91. Id. art. 31(h).
92. See id. art. 28.
93. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,843 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (“The amendment would preclude a certain class of patent-holders
from enforcing their patent rights against infringement, a change that renders
these patents virtually meaningless.”).
94. See id. at S11,845 (letter from Sen. Hatch) (noting that medical practitioners are “the most likely class of infringers” of medical procedure patents).
95. Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000), patentees may not sue a medical
practitioner or associated healthcare entity for either damages or injunctive
relief for performing a medical activity.
96. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 28 (describing the right to
exclude for a process as the right “to prevent third parties not having [the
owner’s] consent from the act of using the process”); PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 247–51 (describing the scope of the exclusive rights).
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§ 287(c) undermines patentees’ rights to exclude others from
using their inventions, in contravention of TRIPS.
2. Availability Without Discrimination as to the Field of
Technology
Under TRIPS, patent rights must be available without discrimination as to the field of technology.97 This rule against discrimination is subject to the exclusions from patentability,98
but these exclusions apply to patentability, not enforcement.99
Thus, a country may exclude medical procedures from patentability, but all patents that it grants must be enforceable.100
The TRIPS drafters added Article 27 to address concerns that
patents would be granted but not enforced,101 which is precisely
what Congress authorized in § 287(c).102 Some critics argue
that this discrimination is justified because of ethical concerns,103 but TRIPS categorically prohibits all discriminatory
acts, whether justifiable or not.104 Thus, an exception based on
enforcement rather than patentability violates TRIPS unless
the exception meets the requirements of Article 30 or 31.
3. Acceptable Exceptions
TRIPS Article 30 allows countries to make exceptions to
patent rights provided that the exceptions “do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”105 TRIPS allows for only a very narrow exception to patent rights;106 it does not permit undermining the substantive
TRIPS provisions entirely.107 An earlier draft of Article 30 sug97. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 27.
98. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 167.
99. Ho, supra note 9, at 657–58.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 659.
102. See id. at 613 n.54 (“[S]ection 287(c) precludes complete patent protection by denying full enforceability of patents.”).
103. In support of the medical practitioner infringement exemption, Senator Frist described the AMA’s various concerns regarding medical procedure
patents. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023–24 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996). These concerns were all ethical in nature. See id.
104. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 170.
105. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 30.
106. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 306.
107. Ho, supra note 9, at 661.
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gested prior use, non-commercial use, and experimental use as
examples of acceptable exceptions.108 Although these examples
were not included in the final language of TRIPS, they “reveal
what drafters envisioned as appropriate balances under
[A]rticle 30.”109
One commentator argues that because medical patents are
usually not enforced against doctors, this exemption does not
unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of patents in
the medical field.110 However, in the case of medical procedure
patents, medical practitioners are the most likely to use the
patent.111 Granting these practitioners immunity from liability
prevents the patentee from making a profit by licensing technology to those who will use it.112 Furthermore, the § 287(c) exception goes far beyond any of the examples the TRIPS framers
suggested. None of these examples goes so far as to prohibit indefinitely enforcement against the most likely users of a patented process.113 Thus, the exemption seriously undermines the
legitimate interests of the patent owner.114 Although patients’
interests are relevant,115 the exceptions cannot “emasculate the
general principles established in the agreements.”116
One scholar also suggests that Article 30 is only appropriate in the absence of a specific Article 27 exception.117 Because
Article 27 explicitly authorizes exclusion of medical procedures
from patentability, Article 30 cannot be used to “dilute” the
regular patent rules.118 Thus, the physician immunity statute
is not an appropriate exception under Article 30. The physician
immunity statute also is not an appropriate compulsory licensing system under Article 31, because it does not meet the speci-

108. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY
158 (1998); see also Ho, supra note 9, at 666.
109. Ho, supra note 9, at 666.
110. See Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 796–97.
111. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch).
112. See Ho, supra note 9, at 663.
113. See GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 158; see also Ho, supra note 9, at 666.
114. See Ho, supra note 9, at 661–63.
115. Article 30 takes third-party interests into account when considering
the propriety of an exception. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 30.
116. Ho, supra note 9, at 661.
117. See GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 159.
118. Id. (“The general exception may thus be invoked only where no special
exception exists, and not to dilute rules applying to such specific exceptions.”).
AND ANALYSIS
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fied requirements.119 Most notably, the patentee receives no
royalties.
B. THE IMPACT OF A TRIPS VIOLATION ON THE UNITED STATES
The failure of the United States to adhere to TRIPS may
result in trade retaliation.120 More importantly, however, it
may have serious effects on the ability of the United States to
increase intellectual property protection in important emerging
economies.
1. The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in
Emerging Economies
Protection of intellectual property assets abroad is a topic
of utmost importance to U.S. companies, inventors, and government officials.121 Intellectual property protection is important for maintaining American jobs and ensuring low costs for
American consumers, because piracy results in an unfair competitive advantage for companies that do not pay the costs of
research and development.122 Emerging economies represent
some of the largest potential markets for American products.123
Unfortunately, these markets also present serious difficulties
for intellectual property protection.124 The United States has
led efforts to increase intellectual property protection in these
countries and has made large strides toward that goal.125 For
example, China—one of the most important emerging economies—joined the WTO and became immediately subject to
TRIPS.126 However, intellectual property protection in China
119. See Ho, supra note 9, at 668–70. For a complete list of the Article 31
requirements, see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31.
120. Ho, supra note 9, at 653.
121. See Bird, supra note 14, at 317; Schwab, supra note 12, at 2.
122. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
123. See CALLAN, supra note 79, at 31 (“The emerging markets . . . promise
an ever growing, ever richer consumer base for IP products.”); Bird, supra note
14, at 317–19 (describing the growth of emerging markets and their importance to American firms).
124. See Bird, supra note 14, at 318–19 (“The lack of intellectual property
rights protection ranks for many firms as the single most significant threat to
their international competitiveness.”); Schwab, supra note 12, at 1 (illustrating U.S. industries’ losses from piracy).
125. TRIPS has been a success, giving the United States tools with which
to encourage developing countries to provide adequate intellectual property
protection. See CALLAN, supra note 79, at 16.
126. Delaney, supra note 80, at 368.
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and other emerging economies remains problematic127 as underdeveloped enforcement mechanisms allow piracy to run
rampant.128
2. The Precedential Effects of a U.S. TRIPS Violation
If the United States wishes to continue strengthening its
intellectual property protection abroad, it must remain a leader
in intellectual property protection.129 One of the foremost ways
the United States can show leadership is by fully complying
with the TRIPS provisions.130 The § 287(c) exception is not
based upon the optional exclusion from patentability, but upon
ethical considerations relating to enforcement,131 which apply
with equal force to pharmaceuticals and medical devices.132
These types of intellectual property are key technologies, the
rights of which are important for the United States to protect
abroad.133 Should § 287(c) remain intact, it will create a dangerous precedent.134 Other countries may argue that because of
ethical considerations, the legitimate interests of third parties

127. See id.
128. Bird, supra note 14, at 334.
129. See Schwab, supra note 12, at 12 (“[I]t is important that we are out in
front, that we play a leadership role and lead by example to encourage other
countries to do more.”).
130. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch); see also Ho, supra note 9, at 671 (“[E]ven an appearance of a
TRIPS violation may impact how other member nations implement TRIPS and
how they react to the United States in future discussions regarding intellectual property protection.”).
131. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Frist).
132. The AMA was once concerned with the patenting of drugs and medical
devices. See Katopis, supra note 9, at 353–54. While the incentives to innovate
are arguably different, the ethical concerns over patenting medical devices are
virtually the same as the ethical concerns about medical procedure patents.
See id. at 356. Similarly, developing nations often cite access to pharmaceuticals as a justification for compulsory licensing. See Susan Vastano Vaughan,
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under TRIPS: What Standard of
Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 101–02 (2001).
133. The loss to the pharmaceutical industry due to intellectual property
infringement is estimated at twenty-two billion dollars per year. Schwab, supra note 12, at 1.
134. See Ho, supra note 9, at 672 (“Other nations may be less likely to uphold the TRIPS provisions if they perceive that the United States, a major
proponent of the TRIPS agreement, ignores its provisions.”); Meier, supra note
1, at 276–77 (“Since the new law allows an infringement liability exception,
other GATT-TRIPs members might follow this example and apply this type of
exception to other technologies.”).
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justify exceptions for other technologies, such as pharmaceuticals or medical devices, under TRIPS Article 30.135 Given the
growing importance of intellectual property rights abroad, especially in the field of pharmaceuticals,136 this is a risk that
Congress must seriously consider.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE DEBATE OVER MEDICAL
PROCEDURE PATENTS
Before Congress adopted § 287(c), the AMA argued for the
complete exclusion of medical procedures from patentability.137
If § 287(c) were repealed, the AMA would likely resurrect this
argument. Conversely, others would argue that medical procedures should be eligible for fully enforceable patent protection.
Parts III.A and III.B describe why these solutions are unsatisfactory. Part III.C proposes an appropriately designed compulsory licensing system that will address the AMA’s ethical concerns while maintaining the incentive to innovate.
A. THE PROBLEMS WITH ELIMINATING PATENTABILITY
The physician immunity statute largely addresses the ethical concerns of the medical community.138 If Congress were to
repeal this exemption because of its TRIPS implications, many
physicians would argue that medical procedure patents should
be excluded altogether.139 This solution is unsatisfactory. Some
important medical procedures would not have been developed

135. The general exceptions can be applied to any field of technology, not
just those specifically exempt. Cf. GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 159 (describing
how the general exception only applies when no specific exception exists).
Thus, other parties to TRIPS may apply such an exception to other technologies. Meier, supra note 1, at 276–77.
136. See Schwab, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the pharmaceutical industry’s losses from piracy).
137. See generally AMA REPORT, supra note 22 (describing the AMA’s ethical objections to medical procedure patents).
138. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Frist) (citing healthcare costs, invasion of privacy, the exchange of information, and peer review as reasons for the legislation); AMA REPORT, supra
note 22, at 2–5 (citing increased costs of health care, patient confidentiality,
and the availability of information as justifications for opposing medical procedure patents).
139. For instance, during the debate over the Ganske amendment, which
would have forbidden the Patent and Trademark Office from issuing patents
on medical procedures, “no one spoke against the basic thrust of the litigation.” Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 792.
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without private funding.140 The AMA argues that these are rare
exceptions.141 However, as technology develops, the cost of new
medical procedures is increasing.142 At the same time, public
funding for such procedures is decreasing.143 Private funds for
research are not available without patent protection,144 because
private investors view patentability as important for ensuring
returns on their investments.145 While medical practitioners
may view public notoriety and the health of their patients as
sufficient rewards for their innovation, these benefits will not
satisfy a private investor.146 Thus, without patents, venture
capitalists will be unwilling to invest,147 and without capital,
doctors cannot afford to develop new procedures. If medical
procedures are not patentable, it is impossible to determine
how many innovations will be lost due to a lack of funding.148
In the absence of patent protection, physicians and investors would need to protect procedures that were developed at
high costs as trade secrets in order to recoup their invest140. For example, the Surrogate Embryo Transfer procedure required significant cost to develop. See Noonan, supra note 2, at 657. The researchers
were forced to obtain private funding after the National Institutes of Health
refused to fund the research. Id.
141. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7 (“[Surrogate Embryo Transfer]
is one obvious counterexample, yet this alone does not undermine a prohibition on patenting of medical procedures, as we do not, in any context, require
general rules to meet the impossible condition of working faultlessly.”).
142. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1143.
143. Id.
144. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,847 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (“It seems unlikely that the inventor of the [Surrogate Embryo Transfer] process would have gotten this private funding if the process was not patentable subject matter.”).
145. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1541 (providing that investors believe patents will ensure a return on their investments); cf. Ove Granstrand,
Innovations and Intellectual Property Studies: An Introduction and Overview
of a Developing Field, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9, 15
(Ove Granstrand ed., 2003) (“[W]hen innovations require investments, as for
most technological innovations, some laws for public or private provision of the
investments are required.”).
146. See Granstrand, supra note 145, at 11 (“[I]ncentive structures differ
among individuals, some preferring monetary rewards in the first place, some
fame and social recognition, some satisfaction from achievement and so
forth.”).
147. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1541.
148. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (providing that patent protection is a means of ensuring efficient medical procedure development); Noonan, supra note 2, at 656 (“[T]he patent grant
is considered necessary to . . . protect large capital investments that are often
required to develop new technologies.”).
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ments.149 Physicians could use trade secrecy to maintain monopolies and charge high prices.150 This response would harm
society because many procedures would remain hidden from
the general public.151 Furthermore, other physicians might try
to develop similar procedures independently, a tactic which
wastes societal resources by promoting duplicative research
rather than new discoveries.152 Thus, the risks of eliminating
medical procedures from patentability are too great to justify
the ethical concerns these patents present.
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH FULLY ENFORCEABLE MEDICAL
PROCEDURE PATENTS
An alternative to eliminating medical procedures from patentability is to simply repeal § 287(c).153 This approach would
make medical procedure patents fully enforceable and reinstate
incentives to innovate. However, this approach does not address the ethical concerns of the AMA and other opponents of
these patents. Most significantly, fully enforceable patents on
medical procedures would likely result in limited patient access
to the procedures.
Patentees could control the licenses they grant through enforcement of their patents.154 Although patentees would have
the incentive to license their procedures to as many physicians
149. Cf. Kent, supra note 46, at 625 (stating that inventors may seek trade
secret protection if the value of patent protection decreases).
150. Trade secrets are valuable because they are not known or ascertainable by others. See KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 24–27 (2d ed. 2005).
151. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 2507 (“The well-known social costs of
trade secret protection stem principally from the innovator’s expenses in preserving secrecy and from the obligation not to disclose technically valuable information to the public.”).
152. See Kent, supra note 46, at 625–26 (“[I]nstead of spending their
resources on improvements of a disclosed innovation, they will be wastefully
spending on research that duplicates the research of their competitor. As a
result, the pace of innovation will slacken.”). Scholars have expressed similar
concerns in other scientific fields. See Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the
Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 255, 261–62 (2003)
(describing how, in the absence of gene patents, overly duplicative “research
and science would lead to a most inefficient and unethical result”); Sheldon
Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1999) (“Scientists, instead of sharing their
discoveries in a timely fashion, are protecting them as trade secrets. This has
resulted in wasteful duplication of research . . . .”).
153. See Ho, supra note 9, at 674–75.
154. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1544–45.
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as possible to increase revenues,155 licensees would not have access to any legal mechanism to ensure that these licenses are
granted as widely as possible and at a reasonable price.156 For
example, patentees could charge high license prices for procedures that were relatively inexpensive to develop. Furthermore,
patentee doctors would be tempted to refuse licenses to hospitals with which they compete so as to attract patients and reduce competition. This alternative approach could cause the
very outcomes the AMA feared—increased healthcare costs and
decreased availability of procedures.
C. A COMPULSORY LICENSE SYSTEM IN LIGHT OF TRIPS
Eliminating medical procedures from patentability fails to
address patentees’ and investors’ needs, but repealing § 287(c)
neglects patients’ interests. A solution that balances the concerns of the medical community with incentives to innovate is
necessary. Adopting a compulsory licensing scheme for medical
procedure patents offers an ideal solution.157 Although the
United States has typically been highly skeptical of compulsory
licensing systems,158 the currently imposed physician immunity
statute is essentially the equivalent of a compulsory license
without remuneration.159 Unlike § 287(c), a compulsory licensing system ensures that patentees receive financial rewards for
their inventions. Thus, in light of the goals of the U.S. patent
system, a compulsory licensing system that complies with
TRIPS Article 31 is a preferable alternative to the current system. If designed properly, such a system will ensure that the
incentive to innovate is maintained without limiting patient access to procedures.

155. Cf. Amy L. Landers, Working Together in a Digital World: An Introduction, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 205 (2006) (suggesting collection of royalties
as an incentive to license patents).
156. Cf. Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1545 (“[T]he patentees may charge
any price for the licenses and royalties. The prices are regulated by the market; thus, according to a basic supply and demand theory.”).
157. Other articles have suggested that compulsory licensing may be a solution, but none has offered a detailed suggestion. See Ho, supra note 9, at
674; Miller, supra note 59, at 455; Noonan, supra note 2, at 664.
158. See Ho, supra note 9, at 647 (“Congress has provided for very few
statutorily imposed compulsory licenses and has restricted the scope of those
licenses.”).
159. See id. at 607 (calling the statute a “royalty-free, compulsory license”).
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1. A Proposed Compulsory Licensing System
In order to effectively address ethical concerns while providing an incentive to innovate, Congress should adopt a compulsory licensing system including the following provisions:
First, if the parties are unable to negotiate a license after
reasonable effort, a potential licensee (whether an individual
healthcare provider or an employer on behalf of all its healthcare providers) may apply to an administrative board for a license to use the procedure for all patients meeting specified criteria.160 If the board finds that this class of patients will benefit
from the procedure, it will determine a reasonable royalty
based on fair market value that the licensee must pay the patentee for each procedure.161 Such a license will be non-exclusive
and non-assignable. In the case of an emergency, however, the
medical professional may use a patented procedure without
prior authorization162 and must apply for a license within a reasonable time after use of the procedure, at which time the
board will determine adequate remuneration.163
Second, a patentee may waive the requirement that potential licensees individually negotiate for a license by submitting
her patent to the board to determine a reasonable royalty. The
board will then grant a universal license for a reasonable royalty to medical practitioners to practice the procedure on all patients meeting certain criteria. Finally, all decisions of the
board shall be subject to judicial review. Any licenses granted
will be available for treatment only within the United States.
A system with these features will ensure that the United
States is in compliance with TRIPS. It will also maintain the
incentive to innovate, while requiring that the procedure be
available to all those in need.
2. TRIPS Compliance
TRIPS recognizes exceptions to patent enforceability in the
form of compulsory licensing, provided the licensing scheme

160. TRIPS only permits use when the potential licensee has made previous efforts to obtain authorization from the patentee. See TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 85, art. 31(b).
161. This authorization of use of the patented process is based on individual merits. See id. art. 31(a).
162. TRIPS allows waiver of the requirement of previous negotiation in the
case of national emergency or extreme urgency. See id. art. 31(b).
163. Id. art. 31(h).
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meets the requirements of Article 31.164 First, an application
for a compulsory license must be “considered on its individual
merits.”165 Thus, certain categories of inventions may not
automatically become eligible for a license.166 “The mere fact
that the prospective licensee has unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain a voluntary license from the patent owner is not a sufficient reason for the grant of a compulsory license.”167 The proposed system does not automatically grant licenses. Instead,
the board will grant a license only if the procedure will benefit
a class of patients. Therefore, this proposed compulsory licensing regime satisfies this TRIPS requirement.
Second, a user must make reasonable efforts to obtain a license on reasonable commercial terms, except in the case of an
emergency.168 By allowing a potential licensee to apply for a
patent only after making a reasonable effort to negotiate a license, the proposal meets this requirement. While the proposal
allows the patentee to waive this requirement, this provision
does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent or
prejudice the patent owner, because the patentee is still paid
adequate remuneration, but with lower transaction costs.169
Finally, by allowing physicians to use the procedure without
permission in the case of an emergency, the proposal addresses
the realities of medical practice.
Third, “the scope and duration of such use [must] be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized.”170 The proposed compulsory licensing regime allows the board to grant a
license for use on a class of patients who meet certain criteria.
Thus, the license is restricted to use on patients who will benefit from the procedure, meeting the requirements of Article
31(c).

164. See id. art. 31. This Note does not describe in detail sections (d), (e),
(f ), (i), or (j), as the language of the proposal on its face meets these requirements.
165. Id. art. 31(a).
166. GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 165; PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17,
at 318.
167. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 319.
168. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(b).
169. TRIPS Article 30 states that “[m]embers may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” Id. art. 30.
170. Id. art. 31(c).
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Fourth, the license must be “terminated if and when the
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to
recur.”171 This termination decision may consider the interests
of the licensee.172 The compulsory licensing regime permits licenses for only a class of patients who will benefit from the procedures because they meet certain criteria. When no patient
meets the specified criteria, the license ceases to exist. However, if patients continue to require the procedure, the license
will continue. Although this approach results in a potentially
indefinite license, TRIPS does not require the right to be limited in time.173 Instead, it must only be limited to the extent
that circumstances require.174 Thus, the proposal is consistent
with TRIPS Article 31(g).
Fifth, and perhaps most important, is the requirement that
“the right holder . . . be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic
value of the authorization.”175 This remuneration should be approximately what a license would cost if the patent owner were
to grant it.176 This provision is the most evident reason that the
royalty-free license created by § 287(c) cannot pass muster as a
compulsory license under TRIPS.177 In contrast, the compulsory
licensing approach requires the board to determine an appropriate licensing fee. Thus, it provides remuneration and is consistent with TRIPS.
3. Effects on the Incentive to Innovate
The primary concern with eliminating medical procedure
patents is that private investors will refuse to invest in nonpatentable procedures.178 Compulsory licensing addresses this
concern by providing patentees with royalties at fair market
value. While compulsory licensing with minimal compensation
may have deleterious effects on innovation, providing royalties

171. Id. art. 31(g).
172. See id. (providing that liability is “subject to adequate protection of the
legitimate interests of the persons so authorized”).
173. See id. (requiring termination only “if and when” it is no longer necessary, not when it is no longer necessary (emphasis added)).
174. See id.
175. Id. art. 31(h).
176. GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 166.
177. See Ho, supra note 9, at 669.
178. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch); Noonan, supra note 2, at 656.
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at fair market value provides adequate incentives.179 Although
patentees will not get the monopoly benefit that they could get
by refusing licenses, this result is justified by the public benefit
of wide access to procedures.180 Since the purpose of patent law
is not individual reward,181 “[t]he essential needs of the society
as a whole may outweigh the exclusive rights of an individual
patentee.”182 As with individual licenses, investors in this system will recoup their investments through royalties. Thus, this
system provides the necessary incentive that patent law strives
to maintain.
4. Financial Costs of Licensing
Opponents claim that licenses will raise the cost of health
care, because the licensing fees will be passed on to the patients.183 However, as described in Part III.A, the cost to patients is far greater if the procedure had never been developed
or freely shared in the first place. Under a compulsory licensing
regime, patentees will not be able to abuse patents by refusing
licenses or by demanding exorbitant fees. Instead, the board
will determine a reasonable royalty to encourage innovation
without placing unreasonable costs on the public. Thus, a compulsory licensing scheme ensures that procedures will be developed and shared while preventing unreasonable excess costs.
5. Transaction Costs and the Chilling Effects of Potential
Litigation
Some commentators are concerned that healthcare costs
will increase because doctors will need to research patents to
avoid infringement.184 While this compulsory licensing regime
requires a patentee to take reasonable steps to negotiate an in179. See Vastano Vaughan, supra note 132, at 104.
180. Cf. id. at 101 (“U.S. Congress balanced human need for access to
medical procedures against the potential damper on innovation and concluded
that human need was paramount.”).
181. See PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 2–6; Burch, supra note 18,
at 1148.
182. Kirby W. Lee, Permitted Use of Patented Inventions in the United
States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L.
REV. 175, 181 (2003).
183. See Miller, supra note 59, at 445–46; Meier, supra note 1, at 266–67.
184. See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (“[P]hysicians face a substantial legal risk every time they decide to introduce a new procedure or a
modification of an existing procedure . . . . because use of a patented procedure
without [a license] constitutes unlawful infringement.”).
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dividual license, as required by TRIPS,185 the patentee may
waive this requirement to decrease transaction costs. Patentees
therefore have an incentive to waive this requirement so they
will receive the same remuneration without the expense of negotiating with multiple individual licensees. Thus, universal licenses will cover most procedures. The patentees will also have
an incentive to inform all doctors and healthcare entities about
the procedure and universal license. If patentees teach more
doctors about the procedure, they gain potential licensees. This
approach will reduce the onus on physicians to research patented procedures.
Even in the rare case that a patentee does not submit her
patent for a universal license, incentives for innovation justify
the small risk of litigation. Although the AMA expressed concern over litigation, the “economic realities of modern American
patent infringement litigation do not suggest that a wave of
medical procedure patent litigation is about to sweep over the
country.”186 The risk of litigation from unintentional infringement is relatively small, because the people most likely to enforce their patents are those attempting to recoup significant
investments.187 It is also unlikely that a court will award an injunction if ethical concerns suggest that the patented procedure
should be available to the public.188 Thus, the incentives to in-

185. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(b).
186. Noonan, supra note 2, at 661.
187. Cf. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen.
Hatch) (“Historically, surgical procedures are not patented. When they are, it
is usually because it is required as part of a business plan to attract the necessary capital for research and development.”).
188. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that traditional principles of
equity are applicable in intellectual property disputes. See Ebay Inc. v. Mercexchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006). In doing so, the Court rejected the
rule that a court will award permanent injunction in patent disputes upon a
showing of infringement and validity. See id. at 1841. Thus, in order to receive
a permanent injunction:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 1839. If withholding a patented procedure from the public is unethical,
the public interest would be disserved by a permanent injunction, so this fourfactor test will not be satisfied.
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novate that patents provide justify these slight risks, which are
required by TRIPS.189
CONCLUSION
In its implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), Congress failed
to address compliance with TRIPS. This omission resulted in a
TRIPS violation with a potentially huge impact for the United
States. Trading partners could use the United States as an example to justify other exceptions to patent enforcement, creating problems for intellectual property enforcement abroad.
However, repealing the statute creates serious ethical problems. Alternatively, excluding medical procedures from patentability will not provide the necessary incentive to innovate
in an increasingly expensive field. A compulsory licensing
scheme addresses the ethical concerns while providing an incentive to innovate and remaining consistent with TRIPS. Ensuring that the United States is in full compliance with TRIPS
will set an example to its trading partners, encouraging them
to do the same. This approach strengthens the ability of the
United States to enforce intellectual property rights abroad at a
time when patenting those rights is of the utmost importance
for United States companies and legislators.

189. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(b) (requiring an attempt
to individually negotiate a license).

